VISCHER (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

6/22/2010 1:32 PM

When Is a Catholic Doing Legal Theory Doing
“Catholic Legal Theory?”
∗

Robert K. Vischer

It is important at the outset to note the limits of this Essay: providing a comprehensive overview of Catholic legal theory is such a
formidable mountain that I disclaim any intention to embark on that
climb. It is practically impossible for one person to capture the whole
field given its breadth, depth, and history. On the question of
breadth, there are scholarly journals devoted in substantial part to
1
the development of Catholic legal theory, blogs like Mirror of Jus2
3
tice, anthologies of Catholic legal theory, an annual conference on
4
Catholic legal theory, and hundreds of journal articles, not to mention a robust pedagogical dimension, with an increasing number of
law schools offering courses that incorporate significant themes from
the Catholic intellectual tradition. As for depth, the field is inescapably interdisciplinary and remarkably sophisticated. Law professors
tend to be professional dabblers, and though I think we are well positioned to play a valuable role in making philosophical and theological concepts more practically accessible by tracing their implications
for law, we need to be careful not to force two millennia worth of reflection and thought into our easy and occasionally superficial legal
concepts and categories. And obviously, the history of the Catholic
∗

Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas Law School (Minnesota). Thanks to
Zachary Calo, Lisa Schiltz, Susan Stabile, and Amy Uelmen for comments on earlier
drafts of this Essay. The Essay is based on a talk given at the conference Religious
Legal Theory: The State of the Field, held at Seton Hall University School of Law in
November 2009. The portions of the Essay discussing conscience—as opposed to the
methodological framework of “Catholic legal theory”—are taken from my book,
CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING THE SPACE BETWEEN PERSON AND
STATE (2010).
1
For example, such journals include Villanova University’s Journal of Catholic Social Thought and St. John’s University School of Law’s Journal of Catholic Legal Studies.
2
See Mirror of Justice, www.mirrorofjustice.blogs.com (last visited Apr. 5, 2010).
3
See, e.g., RECOVERING SELF-EVIDENT TRUTHS: CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVES ON
AMERICAN LAW (Michael A. Scaperlanda & Teresa Stanton Collett eds., 2007).
4
The Conference on Catholic Legal Thought convenes at a different Catholic
law school each June.
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legal theory project is not easily summarized—the project among
American law professors is of fairly recent vintage, but the roster of
Catholic legal theorists includes, of course, Thomas Aquinas, Augustine, the Apostle Paul, and arguably even Aristotle.
As such, I will not even purport to be the final or exhaustive
word on the state of Catholic legal theory. Any authentic insight I
can provide will most likely be more personal, deriving from my own
efforts to contribute to the Catholic legal theory project. I think I can
best capture the aspirations and challenges of Catholic legal theory
methodologies by sharing my own experience with those aspirations
and challenges. Hopefully my comments will resonate with others
engaged in the project and will shed a bit of light on the project for
those who are not so engaged.
My experience working on my book, Conscience and the Common
Good, provides a synopsis of my experience with Catholic legal theory.
To get a sense of how I approach Catholic legal theory, you have to
get a sense of the book, so please bear with me. My book’s central
claim is that our law’s individualized understanding of conscience
threatens the full flourishing of conscience, which is relational in nature. Americans have traditionally embraced the liberty of conscience as an essential limitation on state power, but this understanding has not been much help in resolving an expanding range of
conscience claims in which the individual is opposed not by the state
but by the similarly conscience-driven claims of other individuals and
groups. As a bulwark against state power, a robust right of conscience
is indispensable. As a trump card that empowers individuals to shut
down the moral claims of other marketplace actors, a right of conscience becomes significantly more problematic.
Consider one recent conscience battle in New Mexico. Vanessa
Willock contacted Elane Photography, a husband-and-wife photo
agency in Albuquerque, New Mexico, through its Web site to inquire
5
about photographing her same-sex commitment ceremony. Coowner Elaine Huguenin emailed back: “We do not photograph same6
sex weddings. But thanks for checking out our site!” Willock filed a
complaint with the state human rights commission, alleging a violation of the state’s public accommodations law, which covers sexual
7
orientation. At the hearing, Willock testified that the email “was a
5

Morning Edition: Gay Rights, Religious Liberties: A Three-Act Story (NPR radio
broadcast June 16, 2008), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/
transcript.php?storyId=91486340.
6
Id.
7
Id.
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shock” and caused her “anger and fear.” Jonathan Huguenin explained at the hearing that they made sure that “everything that
[they] photographed, everything [they] used [their] artistic ability
9
for,” was in line with their Christian values. The commission rejected
the photographers’ constitutional claims, found that they unlawfully
discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation, and ordered them to
10
pay attorney’s fees of nearly $7000 to Willock.
When the state moves against the individual, either foreclosing
dissent or coercing assent to the majority’s ideals, it makes sense to
view liberty of conscience as a legal protection that arises at the point
of conflict between an individual’s deeply held moral or religious be11
12
liefs and state power. Unlike cases regarding the military draft or
13
pledge of allegiance, both sides in the Elane Photography case can
wrap themselves in the mantle of conscience. Willock acted on her
belief in the moral legitimacy of same-sex relationships by seeking to
solemnize her commitment with the same celebratory trappings that
have long been part of traditional marriage ceremonies. The Huguenins provide the more straightforward conscience claim, to be
sure, in their refusal to participate in the celebration of a relationship
that they deem immoral. But unlike traditional claims seeking to
protect individuals against the state’s coercive power, both Willock
and the Huguenins are seeking to protect their moral autonomy
against the threat of non-state actors. While Willock’s critics argue
that the liberty of conscience should not be interpreted as empowering individuals to force others to assist their morally contested
projects, the Huguenins’ critics argue that liberty of conscience
should not be interpreted as a license for marketplace providers to
define their professional duties so as to discriminate against members
of historically marginalized groups.
To get a firmer grasp on why New Mexico’s resolution of this
dispute reflects an inaccurate and dangerous understanding of con8

Id.
Id.
10
See Brief of Respondent at 2, Willock v. Elane Photography, No. 06-12-20-0685
(N.M. Human Rights Comm’n Feb. 20, 2008), available at http://volokh.com/
files/willockrespondentbrief.pdf (describing constitutional claims); Andrew Webb,
State: It’s Discrimination; Photographer Refused to Shoot Gay Ceremony, ALBUQUERQUE J.,
Apr. 11, 2008, at A1 (discussing the commission’s decision).
11
See, e.g., Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 68 (1946) (“The struggle for
religious liberty has through the centuries been an effort to accommodate the demands of the State to the conscience of the individual.”).
12
See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
13
See, e.g., W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
9
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science, we need to reclaim a dimension of the term that is discernible from its earliest usage: conscience is a set of moral truth claims
that can be shared with others. The dictates of conscience are defined, articulated, and lived out in relationship with others. Our consciences are shaped externally, our moral convictions have sources,
and our sense of self comes into relief through interaction with others. By conveying my perception of reality’s normative implications,
my conscience makes truth claims that possess authority over conduct—both my own and the conduct of those who share, or come to
share, my perception. Conscience, by its very nature, connects a person to something bigger than herself, not only because we form our
moral convictions through interaction with the world around us, but
also because we invest those convictions with real world authority in
ways that are accessible, if not agreeable, to others. This is the relational dimension of conscience.
Cultivating and maintaining the conditions necessary for these
relationships to thrive should be a priority for our society if we are serious about freedom of conscience. The problem today is that the
state, in Elane Photography and other cases, pays insufficient heed to
these relationships, effectively giving the individual customer’s conscience a trump over the provider’s conscience through the imposition of broad nondiscrimination laws. Increasingly, such laws appear
aimed not simply at ensuring access to an essential good or service,
but at enshrining nondiscrimination as a blanket requirement for
providers’ participation in the marketplace.
Too often, however, the response of those concerned with the
erosion of providers’ liberty is to champion the recognition of a
blanket right of conscience on their behalf. They ask the law to immunize an individual employee’s conscience-driven marketplace
conduct from state penalty or employer reprisal. If an individual
employee of a provider has the unfettered legal right to make her
own decisions about the morally contested goods and services she will
provide, it becomes more difficult for institutions to create and maintain their own distinct moral identities. For example, does the relentless focus on giving individual pharmacists rights of conscience to be
deployed against their employers stand in tension with a discernible
14
rise in the number of small, intentionally pro-life pharmacies?

14

See Rob Stein, “Pro-Life” Drugstores Market Beliefs; No Contraceptives for Chantilly
Shop, WASH. POST, June 16, 2008, at A1. Not all of these drugstores have proven to be
economically viable. See Petula Dvorak, Pharmacy with Moral Convictions Found Few
Clients, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2010, at B1.
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Wedding photographers and pharmacists are the tip of a very
large iceberg. Participants in an exploding array of debates over the
provision of goods and services in our society tend to invoke conscience as a freestanding, absolute value without acknowledging—
much less articulating—the real-world relationships and associational
ties that empower individuals to live out the dictates of conscience.
Besides the battle in the pharmacy, consumer-provider conscience
battles have also erupted over a Christian physician’s refusal to provide reproductive assistance to a patient because she is a lesbian or is
15
not married, Muslim taxi drivers’ refusal to transport passengers
16
17
carrying alcohol, Muslim cashiers’ refusal to handle pork products,
and a Catholic lawyer’s unsuccessful effort to decline a court ap18
pointment to represent a minor seeking an abortion, to name just a
few.
Other legal challenges have taken aim more directly at an organization’s moral identity, particularly its religious identity, based on
perceived threats to the moral autonomy of individual employees or
customers. EHarmony, a leading dating Web site founded by an
evangelical Christian, was forced via litigation to begin offering mat19
chmaking services for same-sex relationships. State universities have
revoked recognition of Christian student groups that exclude non20
Christians or non-celibate homosexuals; legislatures in California
and New York have forced Catholic Charities to cover the cost of con-

15

See N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Superior
Court, 189 P.3d 959, 967–68 (Cal. 2008) (holding that religious liberty and free
speech rights did not exempt physicians from complying with state prohibition
against sexual orientation discrimination); Eithne Donnellan, Infertility Treatment Refusal Led to Inquiry, IRISH TIMES (Dublin, Ir.), Apr. 15, 2010, at 3 (reporting on disciplinary proceedings against Catholic physician who limited fertility treatments to married couples).
16
See Curt Brown, Cabbies Ordered to Pick up All Riders, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis,
Minn.), Apr. 17, 2007, at 1A.
17
See Chris Serres & Matt McKinney, Target Is Transferring Cashiers Who Avoid Pork,
STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis, Minn.), Mar. 17, 2007, at 1A.
18
See Teresa Stanton Collett, Professional Versus Moral Duty: Accepting Appointments
in Unjust Civil Cases, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635, 640–48 (1997)
19
See Victoria Kim, EHarmony Settles Suit Brought by Gays and Lesbians, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 27, 2010, at A9.
20
See Adam Liptak, Rights and Religion Clash in Court Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
2009, at A24 (“The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to hear an appeal from a
Christian student group that had been denied recognition by a public law school in
California for excluding homosexuals and nonbelievers.”).
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21

traceptives for employees; and the Massachusetts legislature required Catholic Charities to place children with same-sex couples as a
22
condition of maintaining its license to perform adoption services.
The modern inclination is to presume that the cause of conscience is
represented by the individuals whose own exercise of conscience may
by burdened by an organization’s distinctive moral identity. Little attention is paid to the conscience-facilitating function of the organizations themselves.
These individualized conceptions of conscience—whether espoused by the consumer or the provider—do not hold much promise
for resolving the new wave of conscience battles because they overlook the relationships that are key to conscience’s long-term flourishing. The state would more prudently support the liberty of conscience by stepping back from the winner-take-all language of rights
talk and allowing Vanessa Willock and the Huguenins to live out their
convictions in the marketplace. Assuming that other wedding photographers are willing and able to shoot a same-sex commitment ceremony, the state should leave the Huguenins to answer to the customer, not the state, and allow customers to utilize market power to
contest (or embrace) the moral norms of their choosing. Rather
than making all photography agencies morally fungible via state
edict, the market allows the flourishing of plural moral norms in the
provision of these services. At the same time, if the Huguenins cannot find market support for their agency’s moral claims, they would
not have an absolute right to force other agencies to hire them and
accommodate their claims of conscience. They should have the freedom to create an economically viable agency with a distinct moral
identity; they should not have the authority to hinder the cultivation
of another agency’s conflicting moral identity. Put differently, the
scope of legal intervention necessary to dismantle Jim Crow should
not serve as the template for which we reflexively reach in our moral
contests today. The remedy of the Civil Rights Act fit the problem
posed by a society hard-wired for the subjugation and exclusion of
African Americans. The marginalization and division accompanying
today’s moral contests do not, in my view, warrant a similar legal response given the conscience-squelching fallout of such massive state
intrusion into the landscape of morally distinct institutions.
21

See Catholic Charities of Sacramento v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004)
(upholding California law); Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859
N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 2006) (upholding New York law).
22
See Patricia Wen, Catholic Charities Stuns State, Ends Adoptions, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 11, 2006, at A1.
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Recently, I was laying out these arguments in a conversation with
the religion reporter for a national newspaper. We talked for a halfhour about my thesis and its policy implications, including my disagreement with the cases involving Catholic Charities. Then the reporter asked, “So are you Catholic?” and I hesitated. I am certainly
not embarrassed about being Catholic, but I had this gnawing sense
of, “Uh-oh, where is this headed?” And then she asked the follow-up:
“Is that why you reached the conclusions you reached?”
I did not really want to answer that question. Of course my
Catholic identity shaped my conclusions, but admitting that seemed
like it would compromise my scholarly integrity in her eyes, or so I assumed. I did not want her to think that I figured out the policy outcomes I needed to achieve as a Catholic and then rigged my theoretical framework accordingly. So the question I have to grapple with is
this: what does it mean for me to be a Catholic doing legal theory,
even when I am not trying to do “Catholic legal theory”?
Answering that question requires me to ask some methodological questions about Catholic legal theory. There are a couple of different ways to get at this. First, I would distinguish between Catholic
legal theory that describes and Catholic legal theory that proclaims.
Second, I would distinguish between Catholic legal theory that is
prophetic and Catholic legal theory that is pragmatic. These distinctions are not rigid or absolute, of course, but they do describe meaningful differences, and being clear about those differences can help
us understand what it means—and equally important, what it does
not mean—to be engaged in Catholic legal theory. In my own work
as a Catholic legal theorist, I might be describing a tradition, I might
be proclaiming its truth, I might be speaking prophetically to power,
or I might be speaking pragmatically about reasonably debatable methods by which to cultivate the common good. At different points, if
I want to contribute to the full flowering of our project, I hope that I
do all of these.
To take the first category, sometimes a Catholic legal theorist is
essentially standing outside the tradition, describing it. In my book, I
do this in the section that traces the intellectual history of conscience,
showing how conscience has been understood through most of the
Christian tradition as moral knowledge that can be shared. At
around the time Augustine was writing, Jerome introduced the concept of “synderesis” to the discussion of conscience (though his discovery of the new term was possibly the result of an error in transcription). While “conscientia” was used to refer to the person’s
application of moral knowledge to conduct, Jerome used synderesis

VISCHER (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

852

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

6/22/2010 1:32 PM

[Vol. 40:845

to designate the person’s apprehension of moral knowledge itself. In
his commentary on the prophet Ezekiel, Jerome analyzed Ezekiel’s
vision of four beings—a man, a lion, an ox, and an eagle—and mentions other writers’ interpretations of the vision:
These writers interpret the vision in terms of Plato’s theory of the
three elements of the soul. There are Reason, Spirit, and Desire;
to these correspond respectively the man, the lion, and the ox.
Now, above these three was the eagle; so in the soul, they say,
above the other three elements and beyond them is a fourth,
which the Greeks call synderesis. This is that spark of conscience
which was not quenched even in the heart of Cain, when he was
driven out of paradise. This it is that makes us, too, feel our sinfulness when we are overcome by evil Desire or unbridled Spirit,
or deceived by sham Reason. It is natural to identify synderesis
with the eagle, since it is distinct from the other three elements
23
and corrects them when they err.

Note that Jerome did not contend that synderesis automatically or
unfailingly corrects the erroneous operation of reason, spirit, and desire. He cautions that “in some men we see this conscience overthrown and displaced; they have no sense of guilt or shame for their
sins,” and they “deserve the rebuke, ‘Still never a blush on thy harlot’s
24
brow.’” Conscience, in early Christian understandings, connected a
person to objective (divine) truth, but its perception of that truth
could be mistaken.
Thomas Aquinas went further, asserting that “conscience is neither a faculty nor a habit, but an act: the act of applying knowledge to
25
conduct.” But conscience is not simply the exercise of the will—it is
in dialogue with the will, though the will should obey its commands.
Like other Scholastics, Aquinas held that the will must be judged by
26
the good as presented by reason, not by the good as it actually exists.
He wrote that “every act of will against reason, whether in the right or
27
in the wrong, is always bad.” In other words, according to Aquinas,
every dictate of conscience is binding, regardless of its truth or falsity.

23

ERIC D’ARCY, CONSCIENCE AND ITS RIGHT TO FREEDOM 16–17 (1961) (quoting St.
Jerome, Commentarium in Ezechielem, in 25 PATROLOGIAE CURSUS COMPLETUS 15, 22
(J.P. Migne ed., Venit Apud Editorem 1845) (n.d.) (internal citations omitted).
24
Id. at 17 (quoting St. Jerome, Commentarium in Ezechielem, in 25 PATROLOGIAE
CURSUS COMPLETUS 15, 22 (J.P. Migne ed., Venit Apud Editorem 1845) (n.d.) (quoting Jeremiah 3:3)).
25
Id. at 45.
26
Id. at 87–88.
27
THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, IaIIae, ques. 19, art. 5, at 63 (Thomas
Gilby trans., Blackfriars 1966) (n.d.).
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The gap between the moral law and a person’s application of the
moral law—a gap which can widen or narrow over time—helps clarify
what is lacking when we characterize conscience as a self-contained
moral code. Conscience is subject to continual shaping by the person’s experience of, and exposure to, sources of moral influence. In
other words, the modern conception of conscience as a mysterious
and inaccessible “black box” is less relational than conscience as part
of an ongoing dialogue that is neither static nor self-contained. The
Christian tradition of conscience can help us understand the external
orientation of conscience, which can in turn show us why the liberty
of conscience must be a social liberty. For this analysis, the fact that I
am Catholic is not all that relevant to my analysis; I am just hopefully
getting the history right. Participants in the Catholic legal theory
project may have greater motivation than other scholars to devote
sustained attention to the portrayal of the Catholic tradition and its
contributions to law, and the community of Catholic legal scholars
may provide a more supportive venue for ensuring the accuracy of
the descriptive work. But obviously this type of scholarship is not limited to the project’s participants.
Another possibility, though, is that my scholarship leads me to
stand within the Catholic tradition, not simply describing its development, but proclaiming its truth. One foundational claim throughout my book regards the social nature of the human person. If I just
say, “Well, some people say that the human person is inherently social,” that cannot really carry my thesis. I need to own it. This sort of
scholarship has the potential to alienate readers, especially if my
proclamation explicitly or implicitly appeals to the authority of my religious tradition for its persuasive power. For example, in my book I
cite Pope Benedict XVI in order to describe the progression of Catholic thinking on a particular issue, but I am more hesitant to cite the
pope when I am seeking to persuade the reader of the truth of the
matter asserted. This is where the Catholic legal theory project encounters a sort of resistance that may be more pronounced than the
resistance encountered by our Jewish, Protestant, and Muslim friends:
in pursuing truth, we are also accountable to a fairly clear line of hu28
man authority, not just the authority of sacred texts.
This was undoubtedly a factor in my hesitation to the reporter’s
question, and why I could not just say, “Well, everyone is shaped by
some perspective.” There is something about the Catholic perspec-

28

I realize that questions regarding the clarity of the authority wielded by the
Church are themselves much disputed by Catholic legal theorists.
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tive that does not quite fit: a real scholar is not supposed to take
marching orders from anyone, much less from a person at the head
of a church spouting, to put it charitably from the secular academic
perspective, “counter-cultural” views. Now I may believe that the
pope says X because X is true, but it is easy for readers (and students
in my classes) to dismiss my citation on the ground that I think X is
true because the pope is saying it, and even more provocatively, that I
would feel restrained from denying X even if I did not believe it was
true because the pope said it was true. So in my own work developing
Catholic legal theory, I need to proclaim the underlying ideas, not
the authoritative packaging in which the ideas are often found. It is
important to build bridges between the Catholic worldview and those
who stand outside the tradition.
There are many bridge-building figures from within the Catholic
tradition, such as the philosopher Charles Taylor. Taylor’s formidable intellectual legacy is built on a Catholic understanding of the
human person, but his profound insights into the human condition
flow from the depth of his simultaneous immersion in Catholic and
modern social narratives. Taylor does not “circle the wagons” against
a hostile secular culture; he opens himself (and his readers) to learning from secular culture without marginalizing the relevance of his
own worldview, which in many ways runs counter to that culture. For
my purposes, Taylor’s work is essential for drawing out the relationship between personal identity and other selves. Taylor shows that
the self is inescapably relational because “[a] self can never be de29
scribed without reference to those who surround it.” Human life is
dialogical in that we can only understand ourselves and acquire an
identity via languages of self-expression, but we enter into these lan30
guages only in exchange with others. It is not simply that a person is
strongly attached to a particular moral framework; the framework is
the horizon against which a person is able to make more particular
moral judgments, locating herself within the everyday world. Without
such a framework, a person “wouldn’t know anymore, for an important range of questions, what the significance of things was for
31
them.” The individual’s articulation of a framework is itself deeply
relational. Taylor points out that “I can identify my identity only

29

CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY
35 (1989).
30
See CHARLES TAYLOR, THE ETHICS OF AUTHENTICITY 32–33 (1991) (“No one acquires the languages needed for self-definition on their own.”).
31
TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 27.
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against the background of things that matter,” which inescapably
draws a person outside herself. American law reflects the truth that
conscience is at the core of personal identity, but the law too often
fails to reflect the additional truth that the core of personal identity is
inescapably relational.
The most profound insights from within the Catholic tradition
are not exclusive to the Catholic tradition because they express fundamental human truths. Relying on work from outside the tradition
can bring this home. For example, Kwame Anthony Appiah notes
that “part of the material that we are responding to in shaping our
33
selves is not within us but outside us, out there in the social world.”
And significantly, our universe of “what matters” will not always be
products of conscious individual choice. This is the point Michael
Sandel makes by asking,
Are we as moral agents bound only by the ends and roles we
choose for ourselves, or can we sometimes be obligated to fulfill
certain ends we have not chosen—ends given by nature or God,
for example, or by our identity as a member of a family or people,
34
culture or tradition?

No matter how individualist our moral framework might be, the
process of articulating that framework is not—and cannot be—
successfully undertaken by the individual in a vacuum. Making sense
of ourselves requires looking beyond ourselves. As a constitutive
element of self-identity, conscience is relational.
So when I, as a scholar, proclaim truths found within my faith
tradition, I need not put up walls between me and my non-Catholic
readers. I should be expanding the conversation, not narrowing it.
Catholic legal theory is not self-contained or inward gazing. Big “C”
Catholic is small “c” catholic, affirming truth and goodness whatever
its source. This is how I think about the natural law. I do not spend
much time writing expressly about natural law, and I fear that, on
some issues, the broader premises from which more particular policy
conclusions proceed are themselves so deeply contested that invocations of “the natural law” seem to shed more heat than light. The
ability of natural law arguments to gain traction in our political and
legal discourse is limited, and those limits must be part of our thinking about how the arguments are most effectively utilized. I do believe that the natural law can help us articulate moral truths that we

32
33
34

TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 40.
KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY 21 (2005).
MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 186–87 (2d ed. 1998).
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know to be true but which often go ignored. In other words, references to the natural law may not always convince people of truths
they deny, but they may force people to stop ignoring truths they
cannot deny, such as the social nature of the human person.
This leads to the second set of categories one sees in the methodology of Catholic legal theory: am I speaking prophetically or practically? Or is it possible to do both? Speaking prophetically, making
truth claims to power—on the sanctity of unborn life, for example, or
on the nature of marriage, or on health care as a right rather than a
privilege, or on the dignity of the immigrant, or on the preferential
option for the poor. There are lots of examples where Catholic legal
theory stakes out principles that run counter to society’s prevailing
judgment. In my book, I am speaking a truth about human flourishing to the emerging legal order—that the liberty of conscience is an
important and natural right, and that a strictly individualized liberty
of conscience is missing much of what is important about conscience.
But we also should have capacity to speak prophetically to the religious order. If I want to reframe the way society thinks about the liberty of conscience, I cannot be afraid of including my own religious
community in my criticism. Occasionally I hear arguments from
Catholics in favor of conscience protection based on the assertion
that the underlying claim comports with the natural law. That argument is a nonstarter politically, and it is also inconsistent with much
of the Catholic intellectual tradition’s understanding of conscience.
A person may be culpable for improperly forming her conscience,
but not for following the dictates of that improperly formed conscience. If Catholics want to secure freedom for Catholic Charities,
for example, to resist laws compelling the provision of contraceptives
or the placement of children with same-sex couples, the argument
cannot be that “these institutional claims are the products of wellformed consciences.” That argument prevails only as long as the
claims themselves prevail politically (in which case there would be no
need for a conscience-based exemption). The whole point is that, on
an expanding variety of issues, the majority of citizens have decided
that consciences reflecting traditional natural law teaching are not
well formed. Yes, they may be “well formed” according to our interpretation of the natural law, but the claim for an exemption does not
aim at persuading the legislature to embrace the “well formed”
judgment as a normative proposition, but to defer to the claimant’s
own understanding of “well formed.”
Or to restate a message I have expressed to the pro-life community: is your commitment to conscience really about conscience, or is
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it just new packaging for the same arguments about abortion? If our
commitment to conscience only extends to the issues we lost politically and is not anchored to a broader framework, the other side can
easily extinguish our conscience claims when they do not share our
view on the importance of a specific issue.
Catholic legal theorists cannot simply speak prophetically; we
must also speak practically. The practical dimension is where we have
struggled at times to know what to say. For example, what should a
35
post-Roe v. Wade legal regime look like? How should the law respect
the dignity of gays and lesbians? If health care is a right, who has the
corresponding duty to provide it, and if resources are limited, then
how do we pay for that right? The fact that an issue is subject to prudential judgment does not mean that the issue is less important, even
when there is room for disagreement among faithful Catholics. Staking out broad truth claims is essential, but ignoring the thorny realworld questions over implementing those truths makes the Catholic
legal theory project appear otherworldly and academic. We should
not shirk from speaking on issues about which reasonable people
may disagree, though in those cases, we should be careful not to portray our conclusions as the only acceptable “Catholic” positions.
In my own book, I try to take practical issues head-on. For example, many Catholics champion individual rights of conscience for
employees, but I am more cautious based in part on Catholic teaching about the important role institutions play in furthering the common good. Creating space for employees’ exercise and expression of
conscience in the workplace is important, but the efforts should not
substitute for the parallel endeavor of constructing the corporation’s
institutional conscience. The corporation’s moral identity is not
simply the sum of its parts; the corporation needs discretion to shape
its own identity. Under some circumstances, this will limit the conscience-driven conduct of individual employees, but that is the price
of the corporation’s mediating role.
To cite another example on which reasonable Catholics can disagree, I do not believe that the liberty of conscience can or should be
limited to religiously formed consciences. If the right of conscience
is to mean something, the modern state is hard-pressed to exclude
nonreligious sources of moral belief from its protection, especially in
light of Establishment Clause concerns. While we should hesitate to
legitimize religiously derived claims of conscience over other types, it
remains important not to diminish the importance of accommodat35
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ing religious convictions, and one effective way of doing so is to address religious convictions specifically. The Establishment Clause
should not be read to foreclose the law’s treatment of religion as a
distinct category of conscience-driven claims. Again, Catholic legal
scholars cannot just trumpet the liberty of conscience—we must help
figure out how it should work in the real world, even when Catholic
legal theory will not propose a single correct answer.
* * *
In the end, maybe my hesitation in answering the reporter’s
question, “Are you Catholic?” is the same hesitation that I would feel
when that question follows any substantive discussion I am having
about issues that matter. Perhaps my fear is that the religious label,
especially the Catholic label, will be an easy way to pigeonhole me
and more easily dismiss my opinions as preordained conclusions dictated by the fact of my submission to an authority beyond reason,
rendering them less authentic and even less human. In this regard,
my hesitation reflects my own misconception of what it means to be a
Catholic legal scholar and about what it means to be a Catholic. My
faith should be the impetus to delve even more deeply into the heart
of what it means to be human, to grapple unflinchingly with the reality of our existence. In a real sense, Catholic legal theory exhibits
much of the same promise and peril of my own personal faith journey. When I use faith as an escape, when I toss off trite prayers to
numb myself to the tragedy that unfolds around me, rather than
praying to express and share in the depth of that grief, I am rightly
dismissed by the grieving. Similarly, when I use faith in my scholarship as a bludgeon to wield against those who reject my worldview, or
when I dress up my unsupported assertions as self-evident simply because they come from my faith tradition, I am rightly dismissed by
those legal scholars who are authentically struggling with the question of how imperfect people should govern themselves in an imperfect world. The Catholic legal theory project has much to contribute
to the legal academy, starting with the anthropological question of
what it even means to be human. Our contribution depends not just
on the relevance of our answers, but also on the humanity with which
we extend those answers.
Of course, I wrote Conscience and the Common Good as a Catholic.
I could not have written it any other way. This fact should not serve
as a conversation stopper, but as an invitation to a deeper, truer conversation, because Catholic legal theory is the working out in law of
the fundamental truths comprising the human condition. In other
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words, Catholic legal theory is about what we, as humans, share; put
even more starkly, it is about what we cannot help but share.

